83-1149

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

MARGARET M. HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

EULA B. STARNES, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1331 or 1361 to entertain respondents' challenge to the amount of benefits payable for a particular medical procedure under Part B of the Medicare Program, notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar in 42 U.S.C. 405(h) and 1395ff.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

In addition to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the petitioners are Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina, Inc., and Prudential Insurance Company of America, which have contracted with the Secretary to administer the Part B Medicare Program on her behalf. They were named in the complaint as representatives of a defendant class consisting of all Medicare Part B carriers (C.A. App. 11), but the district court did not certify a defendant class.

The named respondents are: (1) Eula B. Starnes, Johnnie Kaye Lloyd, Nettie E. Clarkson, Jayne E. Dunlap, and Mae T. Sanders, who are individuals enrolled under Part B of the Medicare Program; (2) Julian Adams, O. Rhett Talbert, Fred H. Allen, Jr., and William H. Stuart, who are physicians who utilize computerized tomography (CT) scanners in connection with medical services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries; and (3) Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory (a South Carolina general partnership in which Talbert is a partner), CT Scanlab (a North Carolina limited partnership in which Allen is a partner), and Atlanta Neurological Clinic, P.C. (a Georgia corporation in which Stuart is a shareholder), each of which owns and operates CT scanner equipment used in furnishing services to Medicare beneficiaries. Respondents Starnes, Lloyd, Clarkson, Dunlap, and Sanders represent a class of all Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in Part B and who have sought or would like to receive Medicare benefits for CT scan services. The other named respondents represent a class of all physicians and physician-directed clinics that own, operate, and use CT scanners in providing services to Medicare Part B beneficiaries. App., *infra*, 30a-31a.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and two insurance carriers that administer the Part B Medicare Program on behalf of the Secretary, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-18a) is reported at 715 F.2d 134. The March 4, 1980 order of the district court entering a preliminary injunction (App., *infra*, 20a-28a), the October 19, 1981 order of the district court regarding class certification (App., *infra*, 29a-31a), and the April 15, 1982 order of the district court denying the motion to dismiss and certifying the jurisdictional issue for interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (App., *infra*, 32a-40a) are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on August 16, 1983 (App., *infra*, 19a). On November 10, 1983, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including January 13, 1984. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 1361 and relevant provisions of the Social Security Act are reproduced at App., *infra*, 41a-42a.

STATEMENT

This case concerns the jurisdiction of a federal district court to entertain a challenge to administrative guidelines affecting the amount of benefits to be paid under Part B of the Medicare Program for a particular medical service.

1. The Medicare Program is divided into two parts. Part A of the Act (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395c *et seq.*) provides insurance for the reasonable cost of hospital and related post-hospital services. 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395c and 1395d. Part B of the Act (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395j *et seq.*), at issue here, establishes a voluntary program of supplementary medical insurance covering, in general, 80% of the "reasonable charge" for physicians' services, medical supplies, and radiology, pathology, and diagnostic testing services. 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395k, 1395*l* and 1395x(s).

Under 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395u, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to enter

into contracts with private insurance carriers to administer the payment of Part B claims on behalf of the Secretary. *Schweiker* v. *McClure*, 456 U.S. 188, 190 (1982). Under these contracts, the carriers determine whether particular services are covered by Part B and the amount of the "reasonable charge" for such services. These determinations are made in accordance with regulations and policy guidelines issued by the Secretary, through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 C.F.R. 405.502(d).[1] The Secretary is expressly authorized to issue such rules and regulations and to establish procedures to carry out the provisions of the Medicare Program. See 42 U.S.C. 405(a), as made applicable to the Medicare Program by 42 U.S.C. 1395ii; *Heckler* v. *Campbell*, No. 81-1983 (May 16, 1983), slip op. 7-8.

If the carrier finds that the services are not covered by Part B or determines that the payment due is less than the amount claimed, the beneficiary or his assignee is entitled to have the claim reconsidered by the carrier. 42 C.F.R. 405.807-405.812. If the claim again is denied and the amount remaining in contro-

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[1] 42 C.F.R. 405.502(d) provides:

Responsibility of Administration and carriers. Determinations by carriers of reasonable charge are not reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Health Care Financing Administration, although the general procedures and performance of functions by carriers are evaluated. In making determinations, carriers apply the provisions of the law under broad principles issued by the Health Care Financing Administration. These principles are intended to assure overall consistency among carriers in their determinations of reasonable charge. The principles in §§ 405.503-405.507 establish the criteria for making such determinations in accordance with the statutory provisions.

versy is $100 or more, the claimant is entitled to an oral evidentiary hearing conducted by the carrier. 42 U.S.C. 1395u(b)(3)(C); see *Schweiker* v. *McClure*, 456 U.S. at 191.

Under 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(1)(C) and (2), an individual is entitled to judicial review of the "amount of benefits under part A" of the Medicare Program if the amount in controversy after completion of administrative review of a particular claim is $1,000 or more.[2] There is, however, no comparable provision in 42 U.S.C. 1395ff for judicial review of the "amount of benefits" determined to be payable on a claim under Part B of the Medicare Program. In *United States* v. *Erika, Inc.*, 456 U.S. 201, 206-211 (1982), this Court held that the text and legislative history of 42 U.S.C. 1395ff showed that Congress "deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims" (456 U.S. at 208).

2.a. This case involves a challenge to the amount determined to be the "reasonable charge" under Part B of the Medicare Program for particular medical services: computerized tomography (CT) scans. Head scans using approved models of equipment have been covered by the Medicare Program since September 1976, and body scans have been covered since August 1978 (C.A. App. 31). Because CT scans were new and relatively expensive diagnostic techniques when they were first approved for coverage under Medicare, they had been the subject of several studies regarding their effectiveness, utilization, and cost. In

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[2] Under 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(1)(A) and (B), an individual who is dissatisfied with the Secretary's determination of his eligibility to participate in the Part A or Part B Program also is entitled to judicial review. These provisions are not at issue here.

June 1977, the Regional Medicare Director for Region IV of the Medicare Bureau (the predecessor to HCFA) sent letters to carriers in that Region informing them of these studies and expressing concern about the increasing variance in charges allowed by carriers in processing claims for CT head scans (*id.* at 27-28). The letters also proposed to include in the next "allowable charge update (fiscal year 1978)" a $150 "reimbursement ceiling" on CT head scans (*id.* at 28).

In December 1977, the Medicare Bureau issued a memorandum to all Regional Medicare Directors stressing the importance of assuring that carriers, when processing claims for CT scans, take into account not only the customary and prevailing charge for the service but also provisions of the Medicare regulations requiring that the charge for a specific service be "inherently reasonable" (C.A. App. 29-30). See 42 C.F.R. 405.502(a)(4) (1977). Subsequently, in September 1978, HCFA issued a formal Intermediary Letter 78-38 to all Medicare carriers to provide "direction and guidance to carriers as to how they should proceed when applying the reasonable charge methodology to develop screens for new and costly medical services and diagnostic procedures, such as CT scans" (C.A. App. 31). The Letter cited several studies concluding that the average charges for CT scan services were excessive (*id.* at 33) and noted that the National Guidelines for Health Planning issued in March 1978 "established 2,500 scans per year as the minimum operating standard" for each equipment unit (*id.* at 32). At that level of service, the Letter explained, a study by the Blue Cross Association had concluded that the technical component of each scan would generally cost less than $115 (*ibid.*)

and a study by the National Academy of Sciences had concluded that a $35 limit on the physician's interpretation fee would be appropriate (*id.* at 33).

Against this background, the Intermediary Letter "strongly recommend[ed]" that carriers implement charge screens reflecting overall limits of $157.50 for CT head scans and $178.50 for CT body scans, covering both the technical component and the physicians' interpretation fee (C.A. App. 33). The Letter contemplated that there would be future adjustments to the recommended limitations "to take into account evolving program experience, changing technology, or other relevant factors" (*id.* at 35). It also stated that an allowance above the recommended limits should be permitted "in individual claims involving unusual medical complications or circumstances" (*ibid.*) or in situations in which a CT scan unit had been approved by the state or local health planning agency but could not achieve normal utilization because of its location in a sparsely populated area (*id.* at 36).

b. The instant suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on November 27, 1979, challenging the amount of Part B benefits payable for CT scan services as a result of the 1977 agency memoranda and the 1978 Intermediary Letter. The named plaintiffs, the named respondents herein, are three medical clinics that own and operate CT head scanning equipment, four physicians who are affiliated with such clinics, and five Medicare Part B beneficiaries who have received services at one of the clinics (App., *infra*, 3a). The district court certified two nationwide classes represented by the plaintiffs: (1) a class of all past, present and future beneficiaries enrolled in the Part B Program who "have sought or desire to secure Medicare reimbursement for CT head scan services * * *";

and (2) a class of "all physicians and physician-directed clinics which now (or in the future) own, operate and use CT scanners in rendering head scan services to Medicare patients enrolled under Part B * * *." App., *infra*, 30a-31a.

The complaint alleged that the 1977 agency memoranda and the 1978 Intermediary Letter were promulgated in violation of the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553, and violate the provisions of the Medicare statute and regulations governing the determination of the reasonable charge for services under Part B. The complaint further alleged that the memoranda and Intermediary Letter violate the plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment because they were issued without notice and comment and were arbitrary and capricious and because the determination of the limitations differed from that applicable to other Part B services, differed from the method of reimbursement for CT scans under Part A of the Medicare Program, and (insofar as Region IV was concerned) differed from reasonable charge calculations for other regions in the country. C.A. App. 15-17.

On October 6, 1980, the district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the limitations on payments for CT head scans until such time as the Secretary promulgated regulations authorizing the Department to set specific reimbursement levels for the service (App., *infra*, 27a). The court concluded that "'[t]here can be no disputing the Secretary's statutory authority to define by regulation the method of computing [the reasonable charge]'" (*id.* at 21a, quoting *Fairfax Hospital Ass'n* v. *Califano*, 585 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir.

1978)). But the court nevertheless entered a preliminary injunction because of its concern that the Secretary had not followed the notice and comment procedures of the APA when he issued instructions to carriers regarding the calculation of the reasonable charge for CT scans (App., *infra*, 21a).

In its order entering the preliminary injunction, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. 1331 notwithstanding the third sentence of 42 U.S.C. 405(h),[3] which provides that "[n]o action" shall be brought against the Secretary under 28 U.S.C. 1331 "to recover on any claim arising under" the Medicare Act. The court reasoned that this Court's decision in *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), holding that Section 405(h) bars the exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 over any claim arising under the Social Security Act, is inapplicable where the claim is not otherwise reviewable under the Social Security Act (App., *infra*, 24a). The district court adhered to this view in a subsequent order dated April 16, 1982, but certified the question of subject matter jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (App., *infra*, 39a-40a).

c. The court of appeals granted leave to appeal (C.A. App. 163) and affirmed the district court's jurisdictional ruling (App., *infra*, 1a-18a). The court of appeals recognized that this Court had held in *United States* v. *Erika, Inc.*, 456 U.S. 201 (1982), that in view of the precisely drawn provisions for judicial review in 42 U.S.C. 1395ff and the legislative history of those provisions, Congress had foreclosed judicial review of a carrier's determination of the

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[3] As made applicable to the Medicare Program by 42 U.S.C. 1395ii.

amount of benefits payable under Part B for a particular service. App., *infra*, 7a. It further recognized that this preclusion of review applies even where the carrier's determination was based on instructions issued by the Secretary regarding the calculation of the reasonable charge, as in *Erika* itself. *Id.* at 9a. The court held, however, that although 42 U.S.C. 1395ff and the decision in *Erika* bar a judicial challenge to a *past* benefit determination, they do not bar a plaintiff from seeking *prospective* relief from the Secretary's actions in administering Part B through the issuance of such instructions. App., *infra*, 9a-10a.[4]

Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that 42 U.S.C. 405(h) does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 over a challenge to a ruling by the Secretary that affects the amount of benefits payable under Part B where the ruling is alleged to violate the APA, the Medicare Act, or the Constitution, so long as the plaintiff does not actually seek an award of benefits from the district court. The court stated (App., *infra*, 15a (footnote omitted)):

> As we view plaintiffs' complaint, the gravamen of their action with respect to the alleged violation of [the] APA, the alleged violation of the

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[4] The court of appeals also concluded that 42 U.S.C. 1395ff and the decision in *Erika* do not bar judicial review of a carrier's decision on an individual benefit claim if that decision is challenged on constitutional grounds (App., *infra*, 9a-10a). However, the court rejected as "frivolous" one aspect of respondents' constitutional claim on the merits: that they had a constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to comment in connection with the promulgation of rules of general applicability. App., *infra*, 15a n.4 (citing *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.* v. *NRDC*, 435 U.S. 519, 542 n.16 (1978)).

> Medicare Act and the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, is to redress those violations. Of course a well-founded complaint in that regard has a secondary effect on the benefits and payments due them. It may well be true that the effect of the preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of the caps granted by the district court entitles plaintiffs to be paid more than they would receive were the caps being enforced. But we do not perceive the suit [as] essentially one to recover benefits; it is a suit to enforce lawful conduct on the part of the Secretary. Cf. *Ringer v. Schweiker*, 684 F.2d 643, 646 (9 Cir. 1982).

The court of appeals acknowledged that in holding that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, it was deciding a "close case" and that a "higher reviewing court" might conclude that it had misconstrued 42 U.S.C. 405(h) and 1395ff (App., *infra*, 15a). But it determined that if Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction, then respondents' challenge could be heard under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. 1361. In the court's view, this conclusion was not contrary to the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 405(h), because that section was intended only to prevent circumvention of the express judicial review provisions in the Social Security Act itself and not to preclude all judicial review of determinations under the Act. The court found no inconsistency with Section 405(h) here because the Act does not provide for judicial review of benefit amount determinations under Part B of the Medicare Program. App., *infra*, 16a-17a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the court of appeals, holding that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1361 to review respondents' challenge to benefit amount determinations under Part B of the

Medicare Act, is flatly inconsistent with this Court's rulings in *United States* v. *Erika, Inc.*, 456 U.S. 201 (1982), and *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Moreover, the issues in this case are closely related to those presented in *Heckler* v. *Ringer*, cert. granted, No. 82-1772 (June 27, 1983). The petition therefore should be held pending the Court's decision in *Ringer*.

1. Respondents brought this suit to challenge the amount of benefits payable for CT scans under Part B of the Medicare Program as a result of the 1977 agency memoranda and the 1978 Intermediary Letter issued to carriers regarding the excessive charges for those services. As this Court held in *Erika*, however, Congress has foreclosed judicial review of the amount of benefits payable under Part B.

In 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(a), Congress provided that "the determination of the amount of benefits under part A [of the Medicare Program], shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by [her]." The Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts with fiscal intermediaries to make these initial determinations on her behalf. See 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1395h. An individual who is dissatisfied with the initial determination of the "amount of benefits under Part A" is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge in HHS if the amount in controversy is $100 or more and to judicial review as provided in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) if the amount remaining in controversy on the particular claim after the hearing is $1,000 or more. 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(1)(C) and (2). On judicial review under 42 U.S.C. 405(g), the individual may contend that he is entitled to receive a greater amount of benefits under Part A than was awarded at the administrative level because the Secretary relied upon an invalid regulation in her "final

decision" denying or limiting the amount of benefits. See *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. at 762.

Determinations and evidentiary hearings with respect to the amount of benefits on a particular claim under Part B are conducted by private insurance carriers under contract with the Secretary. As this Court noted in *Erika* (456 U.S. at 208), 42 U.S.C. 1395ff conspicuously fails to authorize judicial review of the "amount of benefits" under Part B, even though it expressly authorizes such review under Part A. In light of the statute's "precisely drawn provisions," the Court in *Erika* found this omission persuasive evidence that Congress had "deliberately * * * foreclosed" judicial review of benefit amount determinations under Part B. 456 U.S. at 208. The Court found this indication confirmed by the legislative history of Section 1395ff, which evidenced a congressional intent to remove from the courts what were expected to be relatively minor disputes over the amount of benefits under Part B. 456 U.S. at 208-210.

Moreover, as the court below recognized (App., *infra*, 8a-9a), this foreclosure of judicial review under Part B was intended to apply even where the plaintiff challenges an instruction issued by the Secretary that has the effect of limiting the amount of benefits payable on an individual claim. In *Erika* itself the plaintiff's claim to increased benefits was based in part on a challenge to instructions issued by the Secretary that limited the amount of benefits that could be awarded by the carrier. *Erika, Inc.* v. *United States*, 634 F.2d. 580, 589 (Ct. Cl. 1980). This conclusion also is evident from the structure of 42 U.S.C. 1395ff. Congress has authorized judicial review of the "amount of benefits under part A" and, as we have said, such review may include a challenge to regulations that establish benefit amounts or guide

fiscal intermediaries in computing those amounts. The corresponding foreclosure of judicial review of the amount of benefits under Part B accordingly must extend to challenges to instructions or regulations issued by the Secretary that have the effect of limiting the amount of benefits determined by a carrier. Yet the court of appeals would permit a beneficiary to avoid this foreclosure of review simply by filing a suit challenging the Secretary's directives that limit the amount of benefits payable on his Part B claim before he has received a final decision from the carrier on that claim. This result would largely vitiate the Court's unanimous holding in *Erika*.

Nor can respondents circumvent this preclusion of judicial review and the decision in *Erika* under the guise of seeking only "prospective relief" with respect to the amount payable on future claims under the Secretary's directives, rather than the reopening of carrier determinations on past claims (see App., *infra*, 7a-10a). Such a suit is still one seeking judicial review of the "amount of benefits," which 42 U.S.C. 1395ff authorizes in limited circumstances under Part A but not under Part B. Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that the effect of respondents' challenge to the Secretary's directives is to increase the amount of benefits awarded by the carrier (App., *infra*, 15a (quoted at pages 9-10, *supra*)), and respondents would need to have a claim for increased benefits in order to have standing and a substantive basis for their suit. See *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. at 760-761.

The legislative history relied upon by the Court in *Erika* does not suggest a less comprehensive foreclosure of judicial review under Part B than is indicated by the text of 42 U.S.C. 1395ff. 456 U.S. at 208-210.

To the contrary, the Conference Report on the 1972 amendments to 42 U.S.C. 1395ff states that those amendments were added to make clear that there is "no authorization * * * for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B" (H.R. Conf. Rep. 92-1605, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1972)).[5] Respondents' attempt to obtain judicial review of agency directives setting limits on Part B benefit payments for particular services plainly is one "involving amounts of benefits under Part B" and therefore is inconsistent with this expression of congressional intent.

In this regard, the procedure Congress mandated for judicial review of benefit amount determinations under Part A is again significant. It is clear that a Medicare beneficiary cannot circumvent the terms of the Act that limit judicial review under Part A to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1395ff—which provides for review only after the Secretary has rendered a "final decision" on an individual claim and only if there is $1000 or more remaining in controversy—by confining his claim to "prospective" relief. It necessarily follows that a beneficiary cannot circumvent the *complete* foreclosure of judicial review under Part B in this manner.

2. The correctness of the result indicated by 42 U.S.C. 1395ff standing alone—that judicial review of the amount of benefits under Part B is foreclosed because it is not expressly authorized—is confirmed by

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[5] See also *Erika*, 456 U.S. at 208 (quoting S. Rep. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1965)) (the bill "did not provide for judicial review of 'a determination concerning the amount of benefits under [P]art B' "); 456 U.S. at 209 n.11 (quoting S. Rep. 404, *supra*, at 55 (emphasis added by the Court)) (" '*the remedies provided by* [*the statutory*] *review procedures* [*are*] *exclusive*' ").

42 U.S.C. 405(h).* The second sentence of Section 405(h) embodies a general rule under the Social Security Act that judicial review is unavailable except where and in the manner such review is expressly authorized under that Act. The second sentence provides that "[n]o findings of fact or decision by the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, *tribunal*, or governmental agency *except as herein provided*" (emphasis added). Because carriers make determinations on claims for benefits under Part B on behalf of the Secretary (see *Schweiker* v. *McClure*, 456 U.S. at 190), this preclusion of review applies equally to findings and decisions by the carriers under Part B. Moreover, to the extent respondents' challenge is confined to the limitations on payment for CT scans contained in the 1977 agency memoranda and 1978 Intermediary Letter issued by the Secretary on the basis of factual studies of CT scans, respondents actually seek review in a judicial "tribunal" of "findings of fact or decision" of the *Secretary*, which is expressly barred by the second sentence of Section 405(h).

The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. 405(h) further provides that "[n]o action" shall be brought against the Secretary under 28 U.S.C. 1331 "to recover on any claim arising under" the Medicare Act. The court of appeals' holding that the district court had jurisdiction over this suit under 28 U.S.C. 1331 directly contravenes this jurisdictional bar as well. It is similar to the Ninth Circuit's holding in *Ringer* v. *Schweiker*, 684 F.2d 643 (1982), cert. granted, No. 82-1772 (June 27, 1983), that the third sentence of Section 405(h) does not bar jurisdiction under 28

* 42 U.S.C. 405(h) is made applicable to the Medicare Program by 42 U.S.C. 1395ii.

U.S.C. 1331 over a "procedural" challenge to a regulation prohibiting the payment of benefits for a particular medical procedure under the Medicare Program. In *Ringer*, as here, the respondents challenged the regulation on the grounds that it was promulgated in violation of the notice and comment requirements of the APA, was inconsistent with the Medicare Act, and violated the respondents' due process rights. See 82-1772 Pet. Br. 10.

We have argued in *Ringer* (82-1772 Pet. Br. 20-32[7]) that the Ninth Circuit's holding conflicts with this Court's decision in *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, *supra*, that the "sweeping" bar in 42 U.S.C. 405(h) cannot be circumvented by characterizing the challenge as "procedural" or by seeking only prospective relief, that the preclusion of review in Section 405(h) applies even where the plaintiff does not seek an actual award of benefits in district court, and that the "APA" claim in fact arises under the Medicare Act rather than the APA and cannot in any event be brought under 28 U.S.C. 1331. Our submission in *Ringer* applies equally here. We therefore suggest that the Court hold the petition in this case pending a decision in *Ringer* regarding the scope of Section 405(h) and then dispose of the petition in light of that decision.

3. The court of appeals recognized that a "higher reviewing court" might disagree with its construction of 42 U.S.C. 1395ff and 405(h), and it therefore concluded that the district court also had jurisdiction

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[7] We have furnished respondents with a copy of our brief in *Ringer*.

over this case under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. 1361 (App., *infra*, 15a-18a). The question of the existence of mandamus jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare Act is involved in *Ringer* as well, because the Ninth Circuit there held that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1361 over the respondents' "procedural" claims. 684 F.2d at 645-646, 648.

We have argued in *Ringer* (82-1772 Pet. Br. 32-36) that Section 405(h) bars mandamus jurisdiction over cases arising under the Medicare Act and that, in any event, the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction was precluded in that case because, inter alia, the Secretary did not owe the respondents a "clear duty" to act in the manner they sought to compel. Those arguments apply equally here to bar the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction.[8] This additional similarity between the two cases further indicates that the petition in this case should be held pending a decision in *Ringer*.

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[8] The Ninth Circuit appeared to be of the view in *Ringer* that whenever the bar in Section 405(h) does apply, it extends to mandamus jurisdiction as well as federal question jurisdiction. 684 F.2d at 645, 646 & n.2, 648. The court below, by contrast, believed that mandamus jurisdiction would lie even if federal question jurisdiction is barred. App., *infra*, 15a.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be held pending the Court's decision in *Heckler* v. *Ringer*, No. 82-1772, and then be disposed of in light of that decision.

Respectfully submitted.

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JANUARY 1984

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-1543

EULA B. STARNES, JOHNNIE KAYE LLOYD, NETTIE E. CLARKSON, JAYNE E. DUNLAP, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated; JULIAN ADAMS, M.D., FRED H. ALLEN, JR., M.D., WILLIAM H. STUART, M.D., RHETT O. TALBERT, M.D., ATLANTA NEUROLOGICAL CLINIC, P.C., C.T. SCANLAB and TRIDENT NEUROIMAGING LABORATORY, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, APPELLEES

v.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, APPELLANT

and

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA AND BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF SOUTH CAROLINA, INC., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, DEFENDANTS

Argued Feb. 10, 1983

Decided Aug. 16, 1983

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, and MERHIGE,* District Judge.

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* Hon. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

HARRISON L. WINTER, Chief Judge:

We granted leave to take this interlocutory appeal to settle the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to decide procedural, substantive and constitutional challenges to benefit levels set by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to guide private insurance carrier benefit determinations under Part B of the Medicare statute. The district court ruled that it had jurisdiction. It exercised its jurisdiction, however, only to grant a preliminary injunction based upon a prima facie showing of a procedural deficiency in the manner in which the Secretary proceeded, reserving judgment on the substantive and constitutional challenges.

We conclude that the district court has jurisdiction either under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or, under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Part B of the Medicare Program is a voluntary medical insurance program for the aged and disabled, funded by monthly premiums and contributions from general revenues of the federal government. Part B supplements the general coverage of Part A by insuring against some medical expenses not covered by the latter. Determinations of benefits paid for Part B coverage are made by private insurance carriers employed by the Secretary in accordance with regulations and policy guidelines issued by the Secretary. Persons to whom Part B is applicable are entitled to reimbursement of 80 percent of the "reasonable charge" for covered medical services, including physicians' services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k. Under the Medicare Act, the Secretary's determinations as to

eligibility for benefits under Parts A and B are administratively reviewable, as are his determinations of benefits under Part A if the amount in controversy exceeds $100, with a right of judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff. No determination of the amount of benefits under Part B is administratively or judicially reviewable. Once a carrier determines benefits owed to a claimant, they are actually paid out of a government trust fund.

Plaintiffs are (a) Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part B of the Medicare Program, and (b) physicians and clinics which provide computerized tomography ("CT") scans to the class of Medicare patients which the Medicare beneficiary plaintiffs represent. Plaintiffs brought this class action to challenge the establishment and implementation by the Secretary of nationwide and regional ceilings or caps on Part B reimbursements for CT head scans. Through several letters or memoranda the Secretary has established a national ceiling on reimbursement for such services. In June 1977, the Regional IV Office (Atlanta) sent letters to all Part B carriers in Region IV proposing that no more than $150 be paid for CT head scans. In December 1977 a memorandum was issued to all Regional Medicare Directors indicating that $150 was a reasonable charge for CT scans. In September 1978 the nationwide caps were adjusted by a letter issued to all insurance carriers which indicated that a reasonable charge for CT scans should range from $157.50 to $172.50, with the amount allowed in a particular case to depend upon whether contrast enhancement was used in the scan.

The named plaintiffs unsuccessfully exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing this action to challenge the directives. They appealed benefit determinations to carrier-appointed hearing offi-

cers, the only administrative remedy provided under the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C), and they have informally petitioned the Secretary and the Regional Offices for relief from the caps. The Secretary and his subordinates have been steadfast in enforcing the caps, although the Secretary's counsel advised that the Secretary should proceed in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and "make a case in the rulemaking record" why the caps selected are reasonable.

Plaintiffs challenge the cap on a number of grounds. They contend that the Secretary's informal letters, directives and memoranda establishing the caps constitute rulemaking without notice and opportunity for comment, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). They contend that the caps violated their equal protection and due process rights by depriving them of property rights without notice or opportunity for comment and by arbitrarily and unreasonably imposing a different standard for the determination of CT scan benefits than is used for the determination of other Part B benefits. They contend that the caps are inconsistent with the Medicare Act's requirements that carriers, and not the Agency, determine the reasonableness of charges on which benefits to be paid to claimants are computed. And, they assert that the caps violate the requirement that the customary and prevailing charge be paid for Part B services. They seek an injunction against enforcement and implementation of the caps and a direction to the Secretary that she withdraw the caps, advise all Part B carriers of their withdrawal and require all carriers who have applied the caps to recompute claims and make additional payments with interest where indicated. As supplemental relief plaintiffs request costs and attorneys' fees.

On March 6, 1980, the district court ruled that it had jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs' claims, concluded the caps were promulgated in violation of the APA's rulemaking requirements, and preliminarily enjoined their implementation nationwide until regulations authorizing such caps were properly promulgated. The district court reaffirmed its jurisdictional holding on April 16, 1982, reserving ruling on plaintiffs' other contentions, and certified the question for appeal to this court. We granted leave to maintain it.

II.

Plaintiffs allege jurisdiction in the district court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), § 1346 (suits against the United States involving federal questions), and § 1361 (mandamus jurisdiction). They also allege jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, the Administrative Procedure Act, but it is well-settled that that Act contains no independent grant of jurisdiction. *See Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Thus we consider, first, if there is federal question jurisdiction, and, second, if there is jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus. The Secretary argues that federal court jurisdiction is barred by two provisions of the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff and 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. We discuss them seriatim.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff

As we have previously described, § 1395ff provides that the Secretary shall determine eligibility for the Part A and Part B programs and benefit amounts for the Part A program, and that judicial review of these determinations may be had pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). It does not, however, empower the Secre-

tary to determine benefit amounts under the Part B program, nor does it provide for judicial review of carrier determinations.[1] Instead, Part B benefit de-

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[1] Section 1395ff provides:

(a) The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B of this subchapter, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A of this subchapter, shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him.

(b) (1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to—

(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or 426a of this title, or

(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the provisions of part B of this subchapter, or section 1395i-2 of this title or section 1819, or

(C) the amount of benefits under part A of this subchapter (including a determination where such amount is determined to be zero) shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a hearing shall not be available to an individual by reason of such subparagraph (C) if the amount in controversy is less than $100; nor shall judicial review be avaliable to an individual by reason of such subparagraph (C) if the amount in controversy is less than $1,000.

(c) Any institution or agency dissatisfied with any determination by the Secretary that it is not a provider of services, or with any determination described in section 1395cc(b)(2) of this title, shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary (after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing) to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title, and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.

terminations are made by private insurance carriers and are appealable only to carrier-appointed hearing officers. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u.

In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has addressed this scheme. In *United States v. Erika*, 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982), it held that § 1395ff forbade judicial review of Part B benefit amount determinations made by carriers. And, in *Schweiker v. McClure*, 456 U.S. 188, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), it found no due process violation in the use of carrier-appointed hearing officers to resolve disputes over benefit amounts and in the denial of a right to de novo administrative review of their determinations.

We find nothing in the language of § 1395ff nor in the Supreme Court's opinion in *Erika* to suggest that the Secretary's administration of the Part B program, as distinguished from the correctness of benefit determinations thereunder, should not be subject to judicial oversight. The language of § 1395ff indicates that Congress sought to preserve judicial review of actions taken by the Secretary, but not actions taken by private carriers. Section 1395ff renders reviewable those actions to be performed by the Secretary —Part A benefit amount determinations and Part A and Part B eligibility determinations—while those actions which are delegated to private carriers—Part B benefit amount determinations—are made unreviewable. In the discussion of the section in the Act's legislative history, only benefit amount determinations are said to be unreviewable, and in each instance it is also noted that private carriers, and not the Secretary, are responsible for those determinations.[2]

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[2] The Senate Report stated: "Under the supplementary plan, carriers, not the Secretary, would review beneficiary

Erika held that particular carrier benefit determinations are unappealable. The Court phrased the question presented there as whether there is "jurisdiction to review determinations by private insurance carriers of the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare statute." 456 U.S. at 205-208, 102 S.Ct. at 1653-1654, 72 L.Ed.2d at 17-18. And it agreed with the position that the United States had taken in the case that "Congress, by enacting the Medicare statute . . . specifically precluded review in the Court of Claims of adverse hearing officer determinations of the amount of Part B payments." 456 U.S. at 206-207, 102 S.Ct. at 1653-1654, 72 L.Ed.2d at 17-18. Moreover, *McClure* suggests that some degree of judicial oversight of the Part B program is preserved, despite § 1395ff, for the Supreme Court assumed without discussion that it possessed jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to the benefit determination procedures provided by Congress.

Erika does, however, compel the conclusion that a plaintiff cannot seek to reopen a benefit determina-

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complaints regarding the amount of benefits, and the bill does not provide for judicial review of a determination concerning the amount of benefits under Part B where claims will probably be for substantially smaller amounts than under Part A." S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., [1965] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1943, 1975. When § 1395ff(b) was amended in 1972, Congress re-emphasized the absence of judicial review on Part B determinations, again noting the Secretary was not responsible for these decisions. The House Report on the amendments stated: "There is no authorization for an appeal to the Secretary or for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 92-1605, 92d Cong.2d Sess. 61 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, pp. 5370, 5394. From this, we discern that Congress unmistakably intended that carrier determinations be unreviewable.

tion by challenging a regulation or some other action by the Secretary which influenced it. The suit in *Erika* was brought by a distributor of kidney dialysis supplies to challenge the implementation by an insurance carrier of a regulation defining the reasonable charge for a service on the basis of its price in the year prior to the year in which the service was rendered. The Court of Claims concluded that the regulation was invalid, and directed the carrier to recalculate benefits owed to the plaintiff by some more accurate method. *Erika, Inc.* v. *United States*, 634 F.2d 580, 589 (Ct.Cl. 1980). In finding the Court of Claims to be without jurisdiction, then, the Supreme Court implicitly held that a carrier benefit determination could not be reopened even though it was alleged to be unlawful because of some action by the Secretary.

McClure, however, strongly suggests that a benefit determination may be reviewed and reopened when the alleged infirmity is constitutional in nature. In that case the Supreme Court both assumed that it possessed jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the procedures followed in prior determinations and left open the door to future constitutional challenges to benefit determinations when it could be proven that the carrier-appointed hearing officer was biased. 456 U.S. at 195-198, 102 S.Ct. at 1670-1671, 72 L.Ed.2d at 8-9. The issue was not addressed in *Erika*, for while a constitutional claim had been made below it was held to be insubstantial and was not pressed before the Supreme Court. 456 U.S. at 206 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. at 1653 n. 5, 72 L.Ed.2d at 17 n. 5.

Prior to *Erika* there was universal agreement that actions by the Secretary and even private carriers could be assailed on constitutional grounds in either a district court, *Kechijian v. Califano*, 621 F.2d 1 (1

Cir. 1980); *Pushkin v. Califano*, 600 F.2d 486 (5 Cir. 1979); *Cervoni v. Secretary of Health, Ed. & Welfare*, 581 F.2d 1010 (1 Cir. 1978); *St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.*, 537 F.2d 283 (8 Cir.) *cert. den. sub nom. Faith Hospital Assoc. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc.*, 429 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 484, 50 L.Ed.2d 584 (1976), or the Court of Claims, *Bussey v. Harris*, 611 F.2d 1001 (5 Cir. 1980); *Drennan v. Harris*, 606 F.2d 846 (9 Cir. 1979). We see no reason to depart from this position for there is no indication in the Act's legislative history that Congress intended a result so drastic as, by the enactment of § 1395ff, to preclude judicial enforcement of the Constitution with respect to the administration of the Part B Program of Medicare. Thus to immunize the Secretary and the carriers from the Constitution's mandate would raise a constitutional question of the gravest sort, and we decline to adopt such an interpretation unless that is clearly the will of Congress. *See Weinberger v. Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); *Johnson v. Robison*, 415 U.S. 361, 366-367, 373, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-1166, 1168, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974).

In sum, we hold § 1395ff does not restrict whatever right the plaintiffs may have to seek prospective relief from the Secretary's actions, but that it does bar the reopening of past benefit determinations on other than constitutional grounds.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii

Federal question jurisdiction would undoubtedly exist but for the possible bar of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii which incorporates 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) into the Medicare Act. Specifically, § 1395ii states that "(t)he provisions . . . of subsection . . . (h) . . . of Section

405 of this title, shall also apply with respect to this subchapter to the same extent as they are applicable with respect to subchapter II of this chapter." Section 405(h), thus made applicable, states:

> The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.

The precise meaning and scope of § 405(h) has been the subject of a large and ever-expanding body of case-law. *Weinberger v. Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), is the first and most significant authority. There the Supreme Court held that a constitutional challenge to a duration of relationship requirement of the Social Security Act was a claim "arising under" the Act, which § 405(h) removed from federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346. In reaching this result, the Court interpreted § 405(h) literally, to bar use of § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis for any claim arising under the Social Security Act. *Id.* at 757, 95 S.Ct. at 2462. It found that the challenge to the Act's duration of relationship eligibility requirement did arise under the Act since the plaintiffs ultimately sought to recover Social Security benefits and the Act provided them with "both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of their constitutional claims." *Id.* at 760-761, 95 S.Ct. at 2464-2465.

Perhaps significantly, the Act did provide another mechanism for raising the question, and the Court ruled that jurisdiction existed to review the individual plaintiff's claim under 405(g). *Id.* at 763-767, 95 S.Ct. at 2465-2467.

Since *Salfi* the Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss § 405(h) in several other cases. Generally, the Court has held it to bar use of § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis for Social Security Act claims while expanding the possibilities for judicial review and relief under § 405(g). Thus, in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Court held that a due process challenge to disability benefit termination procedures was a claim "arising under" the Act which could only be presented under § 405(g). But, it sustained jurisdiction over Eldridge's claim by interpreting the exhaustion requirement of that section to be waivable so long as a claim for benefits was submitted to the Secretary. In *Norton v. Mathews*, 427 U.S. 524, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976), it deemed a constitutional challenge brought by an illegitimate child to a certain dependency provisions to be so insubstantial that it could be rejected on the merits without deciding whether there was jurisdiction over the case. In *Califano v. Sanders*, *supra*, it held the APA was not an independent jurisdictional basis for claims arising under the Social Security Act. In *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 689, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2551, 61 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1979), it held that class actions and nationwide injunctive relief were permissible under § 405 (g). In *Schweiker v. McClure*, 456 U.S. 188, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the Court assumed, without discussion, that it possessed jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to benefit determination

procedures. Finally, in *United States v. Erika*, 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982), it held that § 1395ff of the Act barred appeals of Part B benefit determinations, and did not consider § 405(h).

Plaintiffs argue that these precedents do not foreclose their contention that § 1331 jurisdiction exists to redress the Secretary's violation of APA, and we agree. There is persuasive authority for that proposition and we conclude to follow it.[8] *See, e.g., National Association of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker*, 690 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1982); *Daniel Freeman Memorial Hosp. v. Schweiker*, 656 F.2d 473 (9 Cir. 1981); *Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano*, 590 F.2d 1070, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1978); *St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.*, 537 F.2d 283, 291-294 (8 Cir.); *cert. den. sub nom. Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc.*, 429 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 484, 50 L.Ed.2d 584 (1976). *But see Hadley Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker*, 689 F.2d 905, 910-12

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[8] Both in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 327, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) and *Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), it was assumed that a due process challenge to benefit termination procedures, and a challenge to the Secretary's refusal to reopen a disability determination, respectively, were barred by § 405(h). We cannot read either case as a square holding to that effect, especially since the claimant in *Mathews* had sought a reinstatement of benefits as an inseparable part of his procedural claim. *See Humana*, 590 F.2d at 1080-81 n. 76. We also note *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Schweiker*, 666 F.2d 34, 39 (4 Cir. 1981). There we held that a claim fell within the scope of § 405(h), even though the requested relief was an order that benefits be recomputed and not necessarily increased, since the plaintiff's ultimate objective, in fact, was to increase its benefits. In that case the plaintiff had made several procedural claims in the district court, but they were not pressed on appeal and we did not rule on them.

(10 Cir. 1982). These cases limit the bar of § 405(h) to claims brought to recover benefits and permit the exercise of § 1331 jurisdiction to adjudicate any other right for which no alternative form of judicial relief is available.

The *Home Health Agencies* case is one of the most persuasive in this line of authorities. It is also one of the latest and it collects all of the pertinent authorities extant at the time it was decided. There, numerous home health agencies and a trade association attacked the validity of regulations requiring home health agencies to seek medicare reimbursement determinations and payment from government-designated regional intermediaries. Because there was no statutory right of judicial review, they sought to invoke federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims that the Secretary had illegally violated the Medicare Act, the APA and denied them due process in promulgating the regulation. As to the jurisdictional issue, the court of appeals held that, in the absence of a statutory right of judicial review, the district court had federal question jurisdiction to decide the issue on their merits, and, moreover, the lack of a statutory right of judicial review did not evidence congressional intent to deny federal question jurisdiction. It stressed that there was not legislative history to indicate that, by the enactment of § 405(h), Congress intended to preclude federal question jurisdiction other than in those instances when an alternative statutory right of judicial review had been established, and that the exercise of federal question jurisdiction was not counter to the purpose of § 405(h). Finally it ruled that the fact that Congress had provided for a statutory right of review in other instances did not overcome the general presumption in favor of judicial review.

As we view plaintiffs' complaint, the gravamen of their action with respect to the alleged violation of APA, the alleged violation of the Medicare Act and the alleged violation of their constitutional rights,[4] is to redress those violations. Of course a well-founded complaint in that regard has a secondary effect on the benefits and payments due them. It may well be true that the effect of the preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of the caps granted by the district court entitles plaintiffs to be paid more than they would receive were the caps being enforced. But we do not perceive the suit essentially one to recover benefits; it is a suit to enforce lawful conduct on the part of the Secretary. *Cf. Ringer v. Schweiker*, 684 F.2d 643, 646 (9 Cir. 1982). We hold therefore that federal question jurisdiction existed in the district court.

III.

We recognize that, in deciding that federal question jurisdiction exists to litigate plaintiffs' procedural challenge, we decide a close case. It may well be that a higher reviewing court may be of the opinion that we have misconstrued §§ 1395ff or 405(h) or the authorities which have considered them. But if there is not federal question jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs' challenges, then we think that there is mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to do so.

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[4] The allegation that there is a constitutional right to notice and opportunity to comment when an agency makes rules of general applicability is frivolous. It presents no substantial procedural constitutional claim. *See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 519, 542 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1211 n. 16, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978).

The federal mandamus statute, added by the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, provides an independent grant of jurisdiction to compel an officer or employee of the United States to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1361. As collected in *Ellis v. Blum*, 643 F.2d 68, 78-82 (2 Cir. 1981), there is an impressive array of cases holding that § 1361 provides a jurisdictional basis to review procedures employed in administering social security benefits.[5] Three, *Ellis v. Blum*, *supra*, *White v. Mathews*, 559 F.2d 852, 856 (2 Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978); and *Barnett v. Califano*, 580 F.2d 28 (2 Cir. 1978), have held that § 405(h) does not preclude mandamus jurisdiction to review the Secretary's procedures in disability cases. They reason that § 1361 does not come within the literal scope of § 405(h) either as it currently stands—it refers only to sections 1331 and 1346—or as it was originally enacted —it then forbade utilization of all jurisdictional provisions contained in section 41 of Title 28, but mandamus jurisdiction at that time was vested solely in the District of Columbia by virtue of the Act of February 27, 1802, 2 Stat. 103. Moreover, they note that preserving mandamus jurisdiction is not contrary to

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[5] The Supreme Court has left open the question whether § 405(h) prohibits reliance on § 1361 as a jurisdictional basis for cases arising under the Social Security Act. *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. at 697-698, 99 S.Ct. at 2555-2556; *Norton v. Mathews*, 427 U.S. at 529-530, 96 S.Ct. at 2774-2775. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. at 332 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. at 901 n. 12. *But see Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. at 111, 97 S.Ct. at 987 (Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurring) (§ 405(h) limits jurisdiction to claims properly brought under § 405(g)).

the purpose of § 405(h), which is to prevent circumvention of the jurisdictional provisions provided by the Medicare Act, since it will only lie if no other remedy is available to the plaintiff.

We think that these holdings are applicable here. We held in *Burnett v. Tolson*, 474 F.2d 877 (4 Cir. 1973), that mandamus will lie when there is (a) a clear right on the part of the plaintiffs to the relief sought, (b) a clear duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question, and (c) no other adequate remedy available. These conditions may all be met here, the third being met if we are incorrect in our conclusion that jurisdiction under § 1331 lies, notwithstanding § 405(h). Certainly the third condition is also met because plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies available to them as well as having unsuccessfully pursued some informal extra-judicial ones.[6]

Even if jurisdiction rests solely on § 1361, we think that the grant of interim injunctive relief was proper. Mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361 permits flexible remedies, including injunctive or declaratory relief.

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[6] This conclusion does not conflict with our earlier decision in *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Schweiker*, 666 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1981). In that case, we held that mandamus jurisdiction did not lie because the second condition was not met; it was "difficult to imagine how the Secretary could have failed to perform a duty owed the providers—*i.e.*, granting them a final decision on their claims—when they have not given him an opportunity to do so by availing themselves of the administrative process." *Id.* at 42. We thus indicated that mandamus jurisdiction was unavailable to those plaintiffs who failed to exhaust administrative remedies, absent a showing that the Secretary frustrated exhaustion by failing to act on the plaintiff's administrative claims. The named plaintiffs here, however, have exhausted their administrative remedies.

Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1126 (2 Cir. 1976); *Burnett v. Tolson, supra*, 474 F.2d at 883. Although the question is relatively novel, we see no reason why a preliminary injunction should not also be available in an appropriate case, and in one case reported, preliminary relief was awarded on the basis of mandamus jurisdiction. *See Dull Knife v. Morton*, 394 F.Supp. 1299 (D.S.D. 1975). That the preliminary injunction may have the effect of increasing benefit payments for CT head scans until the caps are properly promulgated is no objection to its issuance. A court acting under mandamus jurisdiction may compel the payment of benefits by the government. *See, e.g., White v. Mathews, supra; Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon*, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974). We express no view, however, as to whether the district court may also compel the retroactive payment of increased benefits. That issue is not yet before us because the district court only barred the implementation of the caps prospectively. *Cf. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, supra* (retroactive pay increase may be ordered); *De Lao* v. *Califano*, 560 F.2d 1384 (9 Cir. 1977) (doctrine of sovereign immunity bars retroactive order).

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-1543

EULA B. STARNES, JOHNNIE KAYE LLOYD, NETTIE E. CLARKSON, JAYNE E. DUNLAP, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated; JULIAN ADAMS, M.D., FRED H. ALLEN, JR., M.D., WILLIAM H. STUART, M.D., RHETT O. TALBERT, M.D., ATLANTA NEUROLOGICAL CLINIC, P.C., C.T. SCANLAB and TRIDENT NEUROIMAGING LABORATORY, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, APPELLEES

v.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, APPELLANT

and

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA and BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF SOUTH CAROLINA, INC., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, DEFENDANTS

Appeal from the United States [District] Court for the District of South Carolina

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of said District Court appealed from, in this cause, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

/s/ William K. Slate II
Clerk

[Filed Aug. 16, 1983]

APPENDIX C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 79-2311-6

EULA B. STARNES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

—versus—

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This matter came on to be heard upon plaintiffs' verified Complaint and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Instead of issuing a Temporary Restraining Order on an *ex parte* basis, the court held a hearing on December 11, 1979, to consider a Preliminary Injunction against defendant's alleged improper implementation of ceilngs ("caps") on reimbursement for computerized tomography head scans (hereinafter "CT head scans") under Part B of the Medicare Program. The plaintiffs are Medicare beneficaries and physicians and physician-directed clinics which provide CT head scan services to Part B beneficiaries. Class action certification has not yet been granted to the purported plaintiff classes or to the purported defendant class. The plaintiffs challenge the alleged reimbursement caps on various substantive and procedural grounds, including the contention that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter "HEW") has imposed reimbursement caps without complying with the requirements of the

Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 and 701-06.

"There can be no disputing the Secretary's statutory authority to define by regulation the method of computing 'reasonable cost' for charges for which a provider . . . seeks reimbursement under the Medicare program, nor the power of Congress to clothe the Secretary with the power to exercise that authority." *Fairfax Hospital Ass'n. v. Califano*, 585 F.2d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1978). Even so, it is equally clear that such authority must be properly exercised.[1]

During the December hearing, the court became concerned that, as conceded by HEW, the alleged reimbursement caps had not been formulated in accordance with APA requirements despite an opinion from HEW's Office of General Counsel that, in order to properly establish such caps, HEW "will have to (1) proceed by rulemaking rather than by intermediary letter and (2) make a case in the rulemaking record for why the caps selected are reasonable." Complaint, Exhibit D, Letter from Galen Powers, HEW Assistant General Counsel to Robert Derzon, Administrator of HEW Health Care Financing and Human Development Services Division (Aug. 16, 1978). In support of its conclusion, the opinion letter cited the "substantial impact" test developed by some courts in assessing the necessity for following rulemaking procedure. *See Pickus v. United States Board of Parole*, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It went on to analogize the instant issues to those considered in *Schupak v. Mathews*, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID

[1] While HEW's rulemaking activity on benefits questions was exempt from Administrative Procedure Act requirements before 1971, during that year the Secretary waived the exemption and submitted to the Act's provisions. 36 Fed.Reg. 2532 (1971).

GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 27,987 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1976), in which an ESRD formula which controlled reimbursements paid to dialysis facilities was held invalid because it had not been imposed pursuant to proper rulemaking procedure under the APA. The opinion letter noted that although the invalidation order in *Schupak* had been stayed until HEW had an opportunity to promulgate a formula by regulation, other courts have invalidated HEW regulations on procedural grounds without granting such stays. *See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews*, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976); *Maryland v. Mathews*, 415 F.Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976). Finally, the opinion letter suggested that "there is a very good possibility (especially considering that the Department received fair warning in the *Schupak* case) that a court would not stay its invalidation of an intermediary letter that purported to establish [caps on reimbursement] for CT scans."

In its Memorandum opposing injunctive relief, HEW contends that its Intermediary Letter 78-38 (Complaint, Exhibit C) is not inconsistent with its own counsel's opinion letter because it does not impose a cap on CT scan reimbursement, but only "provides direction and guidance to carriers as to how they should proceed when applying the reasonable charge methodology to develop screens for new and costly medical services and diagnostic procedures, such as CT scans." This quotation, taken from the Intermediary Letter itself, is followed by HEW's additional statement that "in this intermediary letter . . . we have provided our own conclusions as to appropriate reasonable charge limitations for these services."

While HEW attempts to distinguish the two, this court concludes that the intent and effect of Inter-

mediary Letter 78-38 is substantially the same as that of a more explicit and less artfully worded cap on reimbursement. Indeed, while on page 9 of its Memorandum HEW makes the above-mentioned denial that any cap was imposed, on page 10 of the same Memorandum, HEW complains that plaintiffs "bring this action more than two years *after imposition of the cap* . . . ." (emphasis added).

Despite its serious reservations about the procedural validity of HEW's action, the court withheld entry of a preliminary injunction, because defendants' counsel at the December hearing indicated that HEW was in the process of developing proposed regulations which would authorize HEW to set specific reimbursement caps for a variety of medical services, including CT head scans, and that HEW expected to submit those proposals to proper APA rulemaking process in the near future. Based upon these representations, the court directed HEW's counsel to submit a clarification of the scope of the proposed regulations and the anticipated time schedule for rulemaking.

On December 18, 1979, HEW submitted its Report, which set out a target date of October 1980, for publication of a final regulation. The Report gave no assurance that publication would be achieved even by October 1980. Instead, it conditioned the proposed schedule upon internal approvals of drafts of the proposed regulations. Contrary to the court's impression from the December hearing, it appears that the proposed regulation has not already been through the draft and approval process.

The court afforded the parties an opportunity to request a second hearing prior to its ruling, but no party sought an additional hearing.

Therefore, from the submissions of record, the December hearing and the applicable law, the court concludes as follows:

1. That this court has subject matter jurisdiction in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the reasoning enunciated in *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Califano*, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 28,718 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 1977). This court cleaves to its previous conclusion that *Weinberger v. Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), do not preclude judicial review where the claims presented are not otherwise reviewable. *See Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States*, 536 F.2d 347, (Ct. Cl. 1976), *cert. denied*, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).

2. There are no administrative remedies to be exhausted in the plaintiffs' procedural challenge to the promulgation of the CT reimbursement caps.

The court expresses no opinion at this time on the separate issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies by the plaintiffs under the substantive (*i.e.*, non-procedural) challenges asserted in the Complaint. *See Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano*, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recognizing that exhaustion requirements may differ, depending, *inter alia*, upon the procedural or substantive nature of the challenge and that substantive challenges to the amount of cost reimbursement due a provider for accounting periods ending on or after June 30, 1973, require exhaustion of administrative remedies by submission to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board before institution of suit in federal district court).

3. That defendant Harris, her predecessor as Secretary of HEW, their agents, representatives, and employees have, since December, 1977, established, authorized, and approved the implementation of a

nationwide cap on reasonable charge reimbursement under Part B of the Medicare program for CT head scanning services and, since July 1, 1977, prior to the implementation of the nationwide ceiling, have established, authorized, and approved the implementation of a similar cap in Region IV of the Medicare Bureau.

4. That defendants Prudential Insurance Company of America, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina, Inc., and other local "carriers" for Part B of the Medicare program have, acting in concert with defendant Harris, her predecessor in office, their agents, representatives, and employees, implemented the Region IV and nationwide reimbursement cap.

5. That the Region IV and nationwide reimbursement cap are lower than the customary and prevailing charges of physicians and physician-directed clinics for CT head scans.

6. That the authorization, direction, and implementation of said cap on Medicare reimbursement for CT head scanning services appear to be illegal and unauthorized in that such actions, having been taken without notice and opportunity to comment upon them and without a statement of their basis and purpose based upon such comments by interested persons, constitute improper rulemaking in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

7. That defendant Harris and her subordinates, the defendant carriers, and other members of the purported class of carriers under Part B will continue to implement the nationwide cap unless restrained by Order of this court.

8. That immediate and irreparable harm, injury, and damage will result to plaintiffs and to the public before a trial can be conducted on plaintiffs' prayer for a permanent injunction in that

(a) many members of the purported class of Medicare beneficiaries who desire and need CT head scan services but cannot afford to obtain such services from a physician or physician-directed clinic whose services are subject to the cap will be forced to seek such services, if at all, from hospitals not subject to the nationwide cap, even though the nearest hospital possessing a CT scanner may be less accessible and less convenient to said individuals and they may not receive the same quality of care. As a result, said Medicare beneficiaries will be deprived of the freedom of choice guaranteed to them by Congress to secure quality medical services from any qualified physician or institution of their choosing;

(b) members of the purported class of physicians and physician-directed clinics will be discouraged, contrary to the policy of the Medicare law, from accepting assignments from potential Medicare patients. As a result, their reputations will be damaged among their Medicare patients and within their communities, and many potential Medicare patients will be forced to seek CT head scan services, if at all, from competing hospitals possessing CT scanners. Said physicians and physician-directed clinics will suffer monetary losses, the amount of which may not be capable of exact determination; and

(c) the cost of the Medicare program to the public may be increased substantially because Medicare beneficiaries who have sought CT head scan services from physicians or physician-directed clinics having CT scanner facilities but for the nationwide cap, will secure such services from hospitals which possess CT scanners. The

additional cost to the public for providing CT services to a Medicare beneficiary in a hospital setting, rather than in a physician-directed office or clinic, may be substantial.

9. That greater injury will be inflicted upon plaintiffs and other members of the purported class of Medicare beneficiaries and the purported class of physicians and physician-directed clinics adversely affected by the nationwide cap by the denial of the relief requested by plaintiffs than will result to defendant Harris, the defendant carriers, and other members of the purported class of carriers under Part B by the granting of said relief.

10. That the public interest will be served by the granting of the relief requested by plaintiffs.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Harris, her agents, representatives, and employees, and other acting in concert with them including defendant carriers and other members of the purported class constituted by all carriers under Part B of the Medicare program, be and they hereby are enjoined from authorizing, directing, recomending, acquiescing in, approving, and implementing any caps under Part B on CT head scan reimbursement which are inconsistent and in conflict with the criteria which were applied by carriers in making reasonable charge determinations for CT head scan services before ceilings were established by the Medicare program.

This preliminary injunction shall continue until such time, if any, as the Secretary may lawfully promulgate regulations authorizing HEW to set specific reimbursement caps for CT head scan services or until further Order of this court.

It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs shall give security in the sum of $5,000.00 for the payment of

such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party, or parties, who may be found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Simons, Jr.
CHARLES E. SIMONS, JR.
United States District Judge

Columbia, S.C.

March 4th, 1980.

APPENDIX D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 79-2311-6

EULA B. STARNES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

—versus—

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

This matter comes before the court upon the Motion of defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina, Inc. ("BCBS"), for Summary Judgment or for an Order dropping the defendant BCBS as a party defendant. In the alternative, BCBS has moved for an Order severing the claim against it from the claims asserted against other defendants. Subsequently, the defendant Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary") moved the court to dismiss Prudential Insurance Company of America and BCBS as defendants in this action.

Plaintiffs have opposed these motions on the grounds that, under the circumstances of this case, the Part B Medicare carriers are proper parties defendant whose presence is necessary to insure full and adequate relief and that an independent claim has been asserted against BCBS and other similarly situated Medicare carriers.

Having considered the written motions of defendants and responses of plaintiffs and the argments made by counsel for both sides in a hearing before this court, the Motion of BCBS for Summary Judgment or for an Order dropping BCBS, or, in the

alternative, for an Order severing the claim asserted against BCBS is denied. The Secretary's Motion to Dismiss is also denied.

Also before the court is plaintiffs' Motion for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 that this case be maintained as a class action. Defendants have opposed the Motion, arguing that a class action would serve no useful purpose in this case. Having considered the briefs of the parties, the record to date in this action, and the oral arguments of the parties, the court concludes that the prerequisites for maintaining a class action set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) are met in this case, and that this action may be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Therefore, plaintiff's Motion for determination of class action is hereby granted, and this action shall henceforth be maintained as a class action on behalf of the following classes:

(1) A Medicare beneficiaries' class consisting of all past, present and future Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the Supplementary and Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled Program (42 U.S.C. §§-1395j-1395w), commonly known as Part B of Medicare Program, who have sought or desire to secure Medicare reimbursement for CT head scan services during such period that Medicare reimbursement for CT services may have been and/or may be subject to the alleged arbitrary ceilings more fully described in the Complaint in this action; and

(2) A physicians' class consisting of all physicians and physician-directed clinics which now (or in the future) own, operate and use CT scanners in rendering head scan services to Medicare patients enrolled under Part B of the Medicare Program during such period that Medicare reimbursement for CT services

may have been and/or may be subject to the alleged arbitrary ceilings more fully described in the Complaint in this action.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Simons, Jr..
CHARLES E. SIMONS, JR.
United States District Judge

Aiken, S.C.

October 19, 1981

APPENDIX E

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 79-2311-6

EULA B. STARNES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

vs.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Plaintiffs, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part B of the Medicare Program ("Part B") and physicians and physician-directed clinics which own, operate and use computerized tomography ("CT") scanners in rendering CT head scan services to Medicare patients, brought this suit as a class action to challenge the establishment and implementation by defendants of certain alleged regional and nationwide ceilings or "caps" on Part B reimbursment for CT head scans (hereinafter the "caps").* Defendants, the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") and certain private insurance carriers under contract with the Secretary, are responsible for supervising and conducting the administration of Part B.

Part B is a voluntary insurance program which provides medical insurance benefits for aged and disabled individuals who elect to enroll in the program.

* The Medicare program is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1395 *et seq.* (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, as amended) (hereinafter the "Medicare Act").

42 U.S.C. § 1395j. It is financed from premium payments by enrollees together with contributions from funds appropriated by the Federal Government. Subject to certain deductibles and coinsurance requirements, a Part B beneficiary is generally entitled to have payments made to him, or on his behalf to an assignee, for the reasonable charge for physicians' and other medical services covered by the program.

Plaintiffs challenge the caps on various procedural, substantive, and constitutional grounds. Plaintiffs contend that the caps were established in violation of the procedural rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") (5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53). Plaintiffs further contend that the caps are substantively invalid in that they are lower than the actual, customary, and prevailing charge criteria for reasonable charge determinations under Part B (42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)); they preclude Part B carriers from performing their duties under the governing statute and regulations (42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.501, 405.502(c)); and they violate fundamental tenents of Medicare law pertaining to the delivery of, and access to, health services (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1395a). Finally, plaintiffs assert that the caps violate their constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.

On March 6, 1980, this Court entered an Order enjoining defendants from implementing the caps "until such time, if any, as the Secretary may lawfully promulgate regulations authorizing HEW [now HHS] to set specific reimbursement caps for CT head scan services" on the ground that the caps were not established and implemented in accordance with the procedural rulemaking requirements of the APA. The Court determined that its subject matter jurisdiction

was founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the reasoning enunciated in *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc.* v. *Califano*, CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide, ¶ 28,718 (D. S.C., December 20, 1977), and that *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), did not preclude judicial review where the claims presented were not otherwise reviewable. No decision was reached concerning plaintiffs' substantive and constitutional claims.

No regulations authorizing the caps have been promulgated by the Secretary, and the March 6, 1980 Order remains in effect. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction against future implementation of the caps and an order requiring reimbursement adjustments where the caps were inconsistent with the reasonable charge methodology previously in effect is pending.

On October 20, 1981, this Court determined that this action may be maintained as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and certified two nationwide plaintiff classes: (1) all past, present, and future Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part B who have sought or desire to secure Medicare reimbursement for CT head scan services during such period that Medicare reimbursement for CT services may have been and/or may be subject to the caps; and (2) all physicians and physician-directed clinics which now (or in the future) own, operate, and use CT head scanners in rendering head scan services to part B Medicare beneficiaries during the same period. The Court also declined to dismiss the defendant carriers as parties.

This matter is now before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction prompted by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit, which reversed the jurisdictional holding of the District Court in *Hopewell, supra. Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc.* v. *Schweiker*, 666 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1981). It is the defendants' position that Congress expressly precluded judicial review of Part B reimbursement disputes such as this one by incorporating into the Medicare Act the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. Section 405(h) provides, in part, as follows:

> No finding of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under § 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.

The Medicare statute provides for judicial review of certain beneficiary claims (i.e., the determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under Part A or Part B of the Medicare program, and the determination of the amount of benefits under Part A.) 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff. Defendants argue that because there is no statutory provision for obtaining judicial review of Part B benefit determinations, § 405(h) precludes such review and deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The legislative history of these Medicare provisions is cited extensively by defendants to support their contention that Congress intended to preclude entirely judicial review of claims respecting the amount of benefits payable under Part B. Moreover, defendants contend that all of plaintiffs' claims arise under the Medicare statute and that judicial review of the entire action is barred. *Weinberger* v. *Salfi*, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).

This court rejected defendants' jurisdiction arguments when it issued its March 6, 1980 Order, and concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) does "not preclude judicial review where the claims presented are not otherwise reviewable." Since that conclusion was premised in part on reasoning articulated in the district court's opinion in *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc.* v. *Califano, supra*, and since the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the *Hopewell* court's decision, defendants argue again that the instant action should be dismissed.

Hopewell was brought as a class action by nursing homes that participated as providers in the Medicare program and their owner-administrators to challenge certain intermediary surveys used to compile ranges of compensation paid to administrators in the region, which were in turn used by the intermediaries in making reasonable cost determinations for reimbursement purposes.* The *Hopewell* plaintiffs challenged the surveys and the use of the ranges of compensation as being in violation of Medicare law and regulations; contrary to the Secretary's own instructions; arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, contrary to the rulemaking requirements of the APA, and in violation of the Federal Records Act.

The district court held in *Hopewell* that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction) and that the surveys were flawed and violated the Medicare law and regulations. It ordered defendants to recalculate reimbursement payable to plaintiffs in 1971 and each

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* Fiscal intermediaries are the Medicare Part A counterparts of Part B carriers. Providers such as hospitals and nursing homes, are generally reimbursed for their reasonable costs under Part A.

year thereafter. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that by operation of § 405(h), subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was precluded and that plaintiffs' failure to comply with the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo, which provides for appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) and subsequent judicial review, deprived the district court of jurisdiction under the Medicare statute. The court also found that mandamus jurisdiction was unavailable.

The Court of Appeals remanded the *Hopewell* case to the district court with instructions to dismiss those of plaintiffs' claims that arose after 1973, when the statute's Part A jurisdictional provisions became operative. With respect to pre-1973 claims for which the Medicare statute provided no avenue to federal court review, the Court of Appeals deferred judgment, holding that only after plaintiffs had satisfied the statute's jurisdictional prerequisites for post-1973 should the district court examine its authority over the pre-1973 portion of the case. In so doing, the court followed the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in *Humana of South Carolina, Inc.* v. *Califano*, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

It is plaintiffs' position that subject matter jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. First, plaintiffs contend that procedural rulemaking challenges under the APA are subject to judicial review notwithstanding 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) and *Salfi* since they arise under the APA, rather than the Medicare Act. Principal reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in the *Humana* case, *supra*, which distinguished procedural rulemaking challenges under the APA from substantive challenges to Medicare reimbursement determinations. 590 F.2d at 1080.

Next, plaintiffs argue that the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in *Hopewell* supports subject matter jurisdiction over their substantive and constitutional challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In declining to dismiss the pre-PRRB Part A claims, the Fourth Circuit observed that the preclusion of all judicial review would be of "disputable constitutionality." *Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc.*, 666 F.2d at 41. By analogy to the Fourth Circuit's treatment of those pre-PRRB Part A claims, plaintiffs argue that it would be improper to dismiss their substantive and constitutional challenges since the Medicare Act does not establish administrative procedures culminating in judicial review under Part B.

Furthermore, plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the facts in *Hopewell* and this case with respect to the exhaustion issue. While the plaintiffs in *Hopewell* made no attempt to secure administrative review of their claims through the Part A PRRB process, certain Medicare beneficiaries and physicians, including several named plaintiffs in this case, challenged the CT caps by appealing reimbursement determinations to carrier-appointed hearing officers, without success. The only avenue of appeal of Part B reimbursement disputes is an appeal of claims involving more than $100 to a Part B carrier-appointed hearing officer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C). Plaintiffs argue that this Part B appeal mechanism is analogous to the pre-PRRB Part A appeal mechanism, which provided for appeal only to Part A intermediary hearing officers.

Plaintiffs also point out that they sought relief from the Secretary at a regional and then a national level prior to bringing this action, and they argue that the Office of General Counsel advised the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Adminis-

tration that the caps were illegal under the APA in that they were not established through rulemaking and that Part B carriers had advised the Secretary that the caps were unreasonable and illegal. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that there were no further administrative appeals to exhaust.

As an additional basis for jurisdiction, plaintiffs assert that mandamus jurisdiction lies against the Secretary under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. *Arkansas Soc'y of Pathologists* v. *Harris*, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 30,706 (E.D. Ark., August 22, 1980); *Waitley* v. *Califano*, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 39,141 (D. Kan. 1978); *see Burnett* v. *Tolson*, 474 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1973). In *Hopewell*, the Fourth Circuit denied mandamus jurisdiction, finding it particularly inappropriate in view of the absence of a showing by the plaintiffs that the Secretary would not act on claims presented to him. 666 F.2d at 42. Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish *Hopewell*, citing their efforts to secure administrative relief from the CT caps, and assert that mandamus jurisdiction would lie under the facts of this case.

In its March 6, 1980 Order, this Court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Having examined *Hopewell*, this Court remains unconvinced that its earlier finding of jurisdiction was erroneous. The Court believes that plaintiffs' APA procedural rulemaking claim is not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). In view of the Fourth Circuit's treatment and the pre-PRRB claims in *Hopewell*, the Court does not believe that all judicial review of plaintiffs' substantive and constitutional challenges should be precluded. Therefore, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

The Court believes, however, that this order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, *i.e.*, whether 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes judicial review of plaintiffs' procedural and substantive claims.

The court is aware that two cases now pending before the Supreme Court may involve related questions, but that neither squarely presents the issue decided here. See *Erika, Inc.* v. *United States*, 647 F.2d 129 (Ct. Cl. 1981), *cert. granted*, No. 81-1594, —— U.S. ——, 101 S.Ct. 2312 (1981); *McClure* v. *Harris*, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1981), *cert. granted*, No. 81-212, —— U.S. ——, 101 S.Ct. 2298 (1981). For these reasons, the Court is of the opinion that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and therefore certifies this order for appeal in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

It is further ordered by this Court that action on plaintiffs' pending Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Class Determination be continued pending resolution of the jurisdictional question by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

/s/ Charles E. Simons, Jr.
CHARLES E. SIMONS, JR.
Chief Judge, United States
District Court

Columbia, S.C.
April 15, 1982

APPENDIX F

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1331 provides:

Federal question

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

2. 28 U.S.C. 1361 provides:

Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

3. Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(h), provides:

(h) Finality of Secretary's decision

The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under sections 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.

4. Section 1869(a) and (b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(a) and (b), provides:

Determinations of Secretary

(a) Entitlement to and amount of benefits

The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A, shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him.

(b) Appeal by individuals

(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to—

(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or section 426a of this title, or

(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the provisions of part B of this subchapter, or section 1395i-2 of this title, or subsection 1819, or

(C) the amount of benefits under part A (including a determination where such amount is determined to be zero)

shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a hearing shall not be available to an individual by reason of such subparagraph (C) if the amount in controversy is less than $100; nor shall judicial review be available to an individual by reason of such subparagraph (C) if the amount in controversy is less than $1,000.

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